We have
heard a lot about the Political Revolution lately. The Sanders movement insists that it is
different from all campaigns that have come before it; that together a
grassroots movement is sweeping the nation, which will change politics forever.
We will look into this in more depth
later, but for now, we got our first taste of this on Tuesday and frankly the
result speaks for itself. Senator Sanders on the eve of the primary went to
campaign for Eric Kingson, the kind of Democratic who shares his values. The
results were not particularly kind.
Sanders’ candidate was defeated by a margin of 49% to 32% with another
candidate taking 19%. There are lots of reasons for this, and to lay all the
blame at Sanders’ feet is absurd. Yet what is also clear is how weak is the
evidence that the Revolution is about more than Sanders or has blossomed into a
movement to engage in politics. In the Presidential vote a little over 2 months
ago Sanders received 26,673 votes in the District. His candidate in defeat
received 3,786 or 14% of the total from two months ago. To win this race for the Revolution would
have required only 22% of the vote from 2 months ago. To be clear changing who
votes and how often they vote is an incredibly difficult challenge, and this
was not a particularly low turnout for such a Congressional primary. But the
point remains that such transformation is a key part of the Sanders platform.
When an obstinate Congress refuses to address a progressive agenda, his plan is
to flood the people into Congress to make them do what he wants. But if he
can’t get more than 15% of his own primary supporters to vote for the
Congressional candidate he wants, what does that say about a strategy that
depends upon the people demanding change.
It takes a lot of time energy and effort to change such voting behavior,
and the problem desperately needs to be figured out. Pretending you have
figured it out it is not a strategy and in fact makes it harder on those who
want to figure it out. Revolution is hard.
Wednesday, June 29, 2016
Tuesday, June 28, 2016
The Value of Super Delegates
Super Delegates are getting a terrible rap these days. The 'slogan' arguments against them are good (undemocratic, they count more than my vote, they are tools of the elite) and it may be that if the slogan arguments are good that is all it will take these days to change something. But the underlying reality is much more complicated. The Democratic presidential nomination system has a lot of advantages, as well as some rough edges that super delegates smooth and that can’t be filed away by other means. In addition, there is a core fairness in rewarding the party members who do work that needs doing.
The roughness of the Democratic primary process results from the fact the Democratic primary process’ grounding principle is very different from the way we traditionally think about elections. The way we traditionally think about elections is that candidates are trying to get past the post, they are trying to get one more vote than their opponent to win. This approach makes sense and assures order. The presidency can really only be in one set of hands, a district can only go to one person. That is how our system works.
The Democratic party’s nominating process, however, doesn’t proceed in that fashion. So that it can more accurately reflect the views of all Democrats, the Democratic party uses a proportional system. If you get 45% of the vote in an individual content, you win 45% of the delegates. Proportionality is present in every single Democratic presidential nominating contest, which amounts to about five hundred separate contests. Each of the 57 different entities (50 states, Washington, D.C., five territories and Democrats Aboard) have a contest, as do regional districts that are mostly aligned with Congressional districts.
For the most part, this works great though it does have a wrinkle. With the exception of Democrats Abroad, every delegate who is selected has one vote in selecting the nominee. This means that in districts with an odd number of delegates a slight winner take all principal comes into effect. Winning by a vote means you snag the odd delegate. If a district has three delegates, winning by a vote gives you two delegates or 66% of all delegates. As one out of 4051 contests, this is not such a big deal. But if that particular result proves decisive, it would seem unfair in comparison to all the other contests.
In districts with an even number of delegates, such as four, a very large plurality is needed to get any advantage whatsoever. If you do reach that plurality but just barely that has a distorting effect as 62.5% of the vote becomes 75% of the delegates, and 62% of the vote becomes 50% of the delegates. This rounding approach likely does not matter because it does not inherently favor one candidate over another. Presumably rounding benefits one candidate in one contest and another in another. Still, a string of one-side plurality victories could produce an odd outcome in a very close race.
Besides the issue of rounding, two other factors make proportionality not entirely in keeping with one person, one vote. Caucuses typically have far fewer participants than primaries and attract more ideologically committed voters, thus potentially skewing the results toward political extremes. The difference this year between the Washington’s non-binding primary results (that favored Hillary Clinton) and the same state’s caucus (favoring Bernie Sanders) shows just how divergent caucus results can be.
A lesser known, but potentially as important wrinkle, is that the district and state level delegates are awarded to those units based on their Democratic performance. If a state or district votes more heavily for Democrats in a previous election, it receives more delegates to the next convention. The result is that African American districts, with their overwhelmingly Democratic performance, get more delegates than other areas. The most extreme example of this is in Ohio, where the Cleveland-based 11th district received 17 delegates to the Democratic National Convention, while all the districts currently represented by Republicans and with roughly similar overall populations received only four delegates each. Now this is not totally out of whack. Obama got 2.4 times as many votes in the 11th as he did in a typical Republican districts such as John Boehner’s former Ohio 8th. Still this inequity exists and is something that might be reconsidered in the future. (Doing what the Republicans do and granting every district the same number of delegates also has problems. For example, 1,223 Republican voters in the Bronx picked three delegates and 76,126 Republican voters in the rural area around Buffalo picked three delegates.
What these three points--performance bonuses, caucuses and rounding--demonstrate is that the Democratic nominating process has rough edges. They are probably worth it to maintain a proportionality that best captures Democrats preferences but they do mean the winner of the pledged delegates may not automatically be the person that the most Democrats want. And yet there is no easy way to fix this. Rounding is necessary unless you want lots of fractional delegates. Caucuses exist because some states don’t want to pay for primaries and because some states need the caucuses as organizing tools. The performance bonus is a feature not a bug that rewards people for voting for Democrats. (It is why Obama won in 2008.)
At the moment, none of this is a real problem because super delegates exist and can correct any glaring inequities. A nominee cannot be chosen simply on the backs of caucuses and rounding that produce an additional 10 delegates or so. If a candidate trailed by about a million votes, super delegates can step in and more accurately reflect the choice of the voters. This therefore is a great reason to keep super delegates. In their absence the party has to trust a process that can produce an unfair, unrepresentative outcome that is hard to fix. Even more so, if no one wins a majority of pledged delegates, the party will put an incredible amount of power in the hand of delegates pledged to third and fourth place finishers. This all creates the potential for chaos. Given that super delegates have never overturned the winner of the pledged delegates and that even the potential for such a result only exists in a close contest, this seems like a worthwhile stop-gap measure. (The Republicans, for example, would never have nominated Trump under the Democratic system.)
This is the mechanical case for super delegates and it is a strong one. It is important to remember that any changes in the rules would only matter in really close contests, otherwise the outcome would be the same.
There is an additional rationale for maintaining super delegates. A political party is not in fact a once-every-four-year enterprise. It is an everyday endeavor. Elections at all levels are held at least once a year, if not more. There are things that need to be done day in and day out. The people who are elected Democratic Super Delegates are the people who do this work. No secret cabal prevents someone who works hard for the party from becoming a super delegate as a result of that work. To a very large extent, people who regularly do the necessary work deserve a voice in who leads the party. Rather than ending super delegates, we should instead have robust contests over who can be elected a super delegate. By disempowering the people who do the work on a daily basis rather than those who simply show up once every four years, you make fewer people want to do that work.
It is also important to remember that in the current system a candidate who gets 58% of the pledged delegates wins without a single super delegate. A candidate who gets 53% of pledged delegates requires only a third of super delegates. It is not a system that actually lends itself to overthrowing voters wishes, particularly because overturning the will of the voters is usually not a winning strategy and super delegates want to win. The super delegates approach is mostly an in-case-of-emergency-brake provision and that is valuable.
A political party is quite like a real party, someone has to throw it. In a way super delegates throw the party. People who throw a party want the guests to have as good a time as possible. They might know something about the house or the neighborhood that the guests don’t. Giving them a say just makes sense. Super delegates function to make the road safer, they don’t change who wins the race. It is easy to fall into the trap of seeing them as an interference. It also may be that the optics of having super delegates have become too damaging. But their actual role in the process is valuable and should be maintained.
The roughness of the Democratic primary process results from the fact the Democratic primary process’ grounding principle is very different from the way we traditionally think about elections. The way we traditionally think about elections is that candidates are trying to get past the post, they are trying to get one more vote than their opponent to win. This approach makes sense and assures order. The presidency can really only be in one set of hands, a district can only go to one person. That is how our system works.
The Democratic party’s nominating process, however, doesn’t proceed in that fashion. So that it can more accurately reflect the views of all Democrats, the Democratic party uses a proportional system. If you get 45% of the vote in an individual content, you win 45% of the delegates. Proportionality is present in every single Democratic presidential nominating contest, which amounts to about five hundred separate contests. Each of the 57 different entities (50 states, Washington, D.C., five territories and Democrats Aboard) have a contest, as do regional districts that are mostly aligned with Congressional districts.
For the most part, this works great though it does have a wrinkle. With the exception of Democrats Abroad, every delegate who is selected has one vote in selecting the nominee. This means that in districts with an odd number of delegates a slight winner take all principal comes into effect. Winning by a vote means you snag the odd delegate. If a district has three delegates, winning by a vote gives you two delegates or 66% of all delegates. As one out of 4051 contests, this is not such a big deal. But if that particular result proves decisive, it would seem unfair in comparison to all the other contests.
In districts with an even number of delegates, such as four, a very large plurality is needed to get any advantage whatsoever. If you do reach that plurality but just barely that has a distorting effect as 62.5% of the vote becomes 75% of the delegates, and 62% of the vote becomes 50% of the delegates. This rounding approach likely does not matter because it does not inherently favor one candidate over another. Presumably rounding benefits one candidate in one contest and another in another. Still, a string of one-side plurality victories could produce an odd outcome in a very close race.
Besides the issue of rounding, two other factors make proportionality not entirely in keeping with one person, one vote. Caucuses typically have far fewer participants than primaries and attract more ideologically committed voters, thus potentially skewing the results toward political extremes. The difference this year between the Washington’s non-binding primary results (that favored Hillary Clinton) and the same state’s caucus (favoring Bernie Sanders) shows just how divergent caucus results can be.
A lesser known, but potentially as important wrinkle, is that the district and state level delegates are awarded to those units based on their Democratic performance. If a state or district votes more heavily for Democrats in a previous election, it receives more delegates to the next convention. The result is that African American districts, with their overwhelmingly Democratic performance, get more delegates than other areas. The most extreme example of this is in Ohio, where the Cleveland-based 11th district received 17 delegates to the Democratic National Convention, while all the districts currently represented by Republicans and with roughly similar overall populations received only four delegates each. Now this is not totally out of whack. Obama got 2.4 times as many votes in the 11th as he did in a typical Republican districts such as John Boehner’s former Ohio 8th. Still this inequity exists and is something that might be reconsidered in the future. (Doing what the Republicans do and granting every district the same number of delegates also has problems. For example, 1,223 Republican voters in the Bronx picked three delegates and 76,126 Republican voters in the rural area around Buffalo picked three delegates.
What these three points--performance bonuses, caucuses and rounding--demonstrate is that the Democratic nominating process has rough edges. They are probably worth it to maintain a proportionality that best captures Democrats preferences but they do mean the winner of the pledged delegates may not automatically be the person that the most Democrats want. And yet there is no easy way to fix this. Rounding is necessary unless you want lots of fractional delegates. Caucuses exist because some states don’t want to pay for primaries and because some states need the caucuses as organizing tools. The performance bonus is a feature not a bug that rewards people for voting for Democrats. (It is why Obama won in 2008.)
At the moment, none of this is a real problem because super delegates exist and can correct any glaring inequities. A nominee cannot be chosen simply on the backs of caucuses and rounding that produce an additional 10 delegates or so. If a candidate trailed by about a million votes, super delegates can step in and more accurately reflect the choice of the voters. This therefore is a great reason to keep super delegates. In their absence the party has to trust a process that can produce an unfair, unrepresentative outcome that is hard to fix. Even more so, if no one wins a majority of pledged delegates, the party will put an incredible amount of power in the hand of delegates pledged to third and fourth place finishers. This all creates the potential for chaos. Given that super delegates have never overturned the winner of the pledged delegates and that even the potential for such a result only exists in a close contest, this seems like a worthwhile stop-gap measure. (The Republicans, for example, would never have nominated Trump under the Democratic system.)
This is the mechanical case for super delegates and it is a strong one. It is important to remember that any changes in the rules would only matter in really close contests, otherwise the outcome would be the same.
There is an additional rationale for maintaining super delegates. A political party is not in fact a once-every-four-year enterprise. It is an everyday endeavor. Elections at all levels are held at least once a year, if not more. There are things that need to be done day in and day out. The people who are elected Democratic Super Delegates are the people who do this work. No secret cabal prevents someone who works hard for the party from becoming a super delegate as a result of that work. To a very large extent, people who regularly do the necessary work deserve a voice in who leads the party. Rather than ending super delegates, we should instead have robust contests over who can be elected a super delegate. By disempowering the people who do the work on a daily basis rather than those who simply show up once every four years, you make fewer people want to do that work.
It is also important to remember that in the current system a candidate who gets 58% of the pledged delegates wins without a single super delegate. A candidate who gets 53% of pledged delegates requires only a third of super delegates. It is not a system that actually lends itself to overthrowing voters wishes, particularly because overturning the will of the voters is usually not a winning strategy and super delegates want to win. The super delegates approach is mostly an in-case-of-emergency-brake provision and that is valuable.
A political party is quite like a real party, someone has to throw it. In a way super delegates throw the party. People who throw a party want the guests to have as good a time as possible. They might know something about the house or the neighborhood that the guests don’t. Giving them a say just makes sense. Super delegates function to make the road safer, they don’t change who wins the race. It is easy to fall into the trap of seeing them as an interference. It also may be that the optics of having super delegates have become too damaging. But their actual role in the process is valuable and should be maintained.
Monday, June 27, 2016
Polling Update #4
We are getting closer and closer to all quiet on the Western front when it comes
to polling. Clinton’s lead has increased slightly in the RCP average from 5.6%
to 6.8%. There are also now no polls whose most recent testing of the voters
has revealed a Trump lead. In the average and in almost all individual polls, Trump remains stuck near 40%. This is as true in polls where he trails
significantly such as the ABC/Washington Post poll that has Trump down 12 and
stuck on 39% as it is in tighter polls such as the Wall Street Journal/NBC Poll
which has Trump down only 5% but holding at 41%. In the average he is at 39.6%.
This has led Trump to begin an assault on polls calling the ABC/Washington Post
Poll dirty. Trump surrogates such as Sean
Hannity have also begun playing the polls are wrong game.
We did notice one interesting thing in Hannity’s generalized whine, which is that it uses a March story about how many more R’s had voted than D’s. In reality, as we will explain more comprehensively in a later post after all the votes are counted, there is now no doubt that more people participated in the Democratic primary process than in the Republican primary process. It was close and probably close enough that had the contested dragged on until the end on the R side, Republicans might have had more participants. This is a close call, and it is impossible to compare exactly because of all the different kinds of contests in different states. But the myth that many more Republicans voted needs to be put out of its misery. We will tackle this more fully when all the numbers are in.
Overall the point remains a somewhat sizable Clinton lead and a Trump campaign that is left attacking polls, a stance seldom taken by a campaign that is winning. It hurts Trump’s brand to be behind.
We did notice one interesting thing in Hannity’s generalized whine, which is that it uses a March story about how many more R’s had voted than D’s. In reality, as we will explain more comprehensively in a later post after all the votes are counted, there is now no doubt that more people participated in the Democratic primary process than in the Republican primary process. It was close and probably close enough that had the contested dragged on until the end on the R side, Republicans might have had more participants. This is a close call, and it is impossible to compare exactly because of all the different kinds of contests in different states. But the myth that many more Republicans voted needs to be put out of its misery. We will tackle this more fully when all the numbers are in.
Overall the point remains a somewhat sizable Clinton lead and a Trump campaign that is left attacking polls, a stance seldom taken by a campaign that is winning. It hurts Trump’s brand to be behind.
Friday, June 24, 2016
Why the Tribal Era as Evidenced in Brexit Still Won’t Save Trump
We got a
very surprising result from across the pond last night. We don’t claim any
special knowledge of British politics or any particular insight into how the
E.U. will work. Yet, it seems a nationalism that borders on tribalism was the
main force at work in the E.U. referendum. The electorate statement seems to be:
“We the British don’t need to be part of something bigger than ourselves. We
can handle our own affairs.” The clear desire to keep out immigrants is also built
into this own affairs business. The tribalism involved is the key point.
This tribalism
initially seems like good news for Donald Trump and in some ways it is.
American white nationalism may keep Trump closer than the structure of his
campaign would otherwise allow. The difference is that tribalism in the United
States cuts both ways. Non-whites in the U.S., who represent more than double
the number of non-white voters in the UK, have a tribal identity as much as
white nationalists do. This tribe, or more accurately tribes, quite rightly
sees Trump as an absolute mortal enemy. There could be turnout issues, but there
is no desire for Trump among non-whites.
The UK
referendum also did not have the same partisan edge that the election here has.
Surveys consistently show that your partisan affiliation colors how you see
events. Although the stock market’s performance is a fact, for example, Republicans
perceive the market as doing worse than its actual performance because that
fits their worldview.
If people do
end up retreating to their respective camps, it will keep the race close but it
also makes it very hard for Trump to win because his camp is simply smaller. It
is not smaller by much, which explains Republican gains in midterms. Given the
small difference, it does not take much turmoil on one side for the other side
to win. But the tribal nature of elections makes winning nationally harder, not
easier for Republicans.
Wednesday, June 22, 2016
If They Did It, Here Is How It Would Be Done
In the six weeks since Donald Trump has clinched the nomination little has gone right for him. He has fallen behind about six points in the polls. He has struggled to raise money. He has gotten bad headlines. A Senator has come forward to unendorse him. The press is being much harsher than in the primary.
All of this had led to rumblings that an attempt to overthrow Donald Trump will be made at the convention. As we said when this idea first arose as voters were still voting, it all comes down to what the delegates want to do. There are 2472 delegates, which means the name of the game is getting to 1237 delegates, the same as it ever was. In the end, Trump won 1537 delegates including support from some unpledged delegates. This give Trump a decent sized cushion.
On the Democratic side, this would not be an issue at all because campaigns screen delegates elected for a candidate for their loyalty. But on the Republican side they aren’t. So all that is required is 301 defections from delegates who are not necessarily loyal to Trump. A good example: Georgia Cruz supporter Bob Barr is a “Trump” delegate. It may be that as few as half or even fewer Trump delegates are truly loyal to him.
So it does not take much to stop Trump. The Republican National Convention’s rules committee can change the rules. It seems like the plan now is to give the delegates a conscience clause. If such a clause passes all it would take to throw Trump’s nomination into jeopardy is for some number of delegates to abstain on the first ballot. This might have the effect of “unbinding” the delegates on future ballots and thus ruin Trump’s hopes of being the nominee.
This is incredibly do-able. The question is whether enough delegates actually have the will to do it, which would require overturning the results of the primary election. The means are simple and easy. But still seems doubtful that the delegates will have this kind of will even though they do have the means.
All of this had led to rumblings that an attempt to overthrow Donald Trump will be made at the convention. As we said when this idea first arose as voters were still voting, it all comes down to what the delegates want to do. There are 2472 delegates, which means the name of the game is getting to 1237 delegates, the same as it ever was. In the end, Trump won 1537 delegates including support from some unpledged delegates. This give Trump a decent sized cushion.
On the Democratic side, this would not be an issue at all because campaigns screen delegates elected for a candidate for their loyalty. But on the Republican side they aren’t. So all that is required is 301 defections from delegates who are not necessarily loyal to Trump. A good example: Georgia Cruz supporter Bob Barr is a “Trump” delegate. It may be that as few as half or even fewer Trump delegates are truly loyal to him.
So it does not take much to stop Trump. The Republican National Convention’s rules committee can change the rules. It seems like the plan now is to give the delegates a conscience clause. If such a clause passes all it would take to throw Trump’s nomination into jeopardy is for some number of delegates to abstain on the first ballot. This might have the effect of “unbinding” the delegates on future ballots and thus ruin Trump’s hopes of being the nominee.
This is incredibly do-able. The question is whether enough delegates actually have the will to do it, which would require overturning the results of the primary election. The means are simple and easy. But still seems doubtful that the delegates will have this kind of will even though they do have the means.
Monday, June 20, 2016
The Democrats Downside in Tonight’s Gun Vote
After Democratic Senator Chris Murphy launched a filibuster to do something about gun violence in the wake of Orlando, Republicans agreed to a vote on two key items: barring gun purchases by those on the no-fly list and increasing background checks. The Senate just voted on both.
The merit of the particular proposals is not our purview; the potential political ramification is. Democrats are endeavoring to retake the Senate and hope to use this issue against incumbent Republicans. In some ways, the Democrats have been successful. Some Republicans are in fact now flipping sides. But in some ways, the Democrats have not been successful. They’ve allowed endangered Republican Senators to take a vote that makes them seem reasonable and more electable (which only two took advantage of).
Now obviously it doesn’t make sense to avoid making good policy because it will make your opponents look good too. Yet the gun-control bill that emerges from the Senate, if one emerges at all, is likely to be DOA in the House regardless. Everything we know about how the House has operated makes that the outcome. So Democrats may be decreasing the salience of an issue with some voters in an exchange for a vote that will result in no change in the law. Republican incumbents can appear moderate with very little in the way of consequences.
Overall the Democrats’ filibuster probably was a good strategy but some Senate Republicans may take advantage of it to cast votes that will help them in their re-election fight. That should be acknowledged.
The merit of the particular proposals is not our purview; the potential political ramification is. Democrats are endeavoring to retake the Senate and hope to use this issue against incumbent Republicans. In some ways, the Democrats have been successful. Some Republicans are in fact now flipping sides. But in some ways, the Democrats have not been successful. They’ve allowed endangered Republican Senators to take a vote that makes them seem reasonable and more electable (which only two took advantage of).
Now obviously it doesn’t make sense to avoid making good policy because it will make your opponents look good too. Yet the gun-control bill that emerges from the Senate, if one emerges at all, is likely to be DOA in the House regardless. Everything we know about how the House has operated makes that the outcome. So Democrats may be decreasing the salience of an issue with some voters in an exchange for a vote that will result in no change in the law. Republican incumbents can appear moderate with very little in the way of consequences.
Overall the Democrats’ filibuster probably was a good strategy but some Senate Republicans may take advantage of it to cast votes that will help them in their re-election fight. That should be acknowledged.
Friday, June 17, 2016
Fighting the Last War or How to Kill the (Sanders) Revolution
The primary is over. We are waiting to hear from Bernie on his intentions going forward (Thursday’s speech provided little clarity) but it’s hard to see what he can possibly do. He does have a list of demands. Some are understandable, such as asking to remove Debbie Wasserman Schultz as DNC chair (though that does seem oddly personal) and seeking to incorporate his policy goals into the Democratic platform. But the other two causes, getting rid of super delegates and opening up primaries, don’t seem to further his cause. They may appear to benefit the Sanders revolution, yet they actually don’t. We will dig into super delegates later. Today’s issue is open primaries.
On this front, we believe Sanders is fighting the last war. One of the most difficult things in politics is to think ahead. There is no doubt open primaries that allowed other than Democrats to vote would have benefited Sanders slightly in this election. Sanders’s two other proposed rule changes, the end of super delegates and same-day registration, also would have benefited him in this election. But as Hillary Clinton quickly discovered, support in one race does not automatically transfer to the next race. Open primaries won’t necessarily benefit progressives in future races.
To see that, we can look at what happened in an open primary this year where Sanders won with a coalition of the left, the disgruntled and the young. Sanders’ support began with people who wanted more liberal policies than those pursued by the President, what might be considered “the left.” In Michigan’s open primary, these liberals were 31% of the electorate, according to exit polls. They voted for Sanders by a nearly 3-1 margin. This was his base in state after state and it would have won him 30% of the vote regardless.
Another 13% of those voting in the Michigan Democratic party wanted more conservative policies than those of the President. Bernie Sanders is not to Barack Obama’s right on a single issue and yet Sanders was able to win 53% of this group. Sanders may like to believe these conservative voters joined his movement but perhaps they simply did not know much about Sanders beyond the fact that he was against the powers that be and he was not Clinton. They constituted “the disgruntled” in his coalition. Another exit poll question revealed how strongly this group went for Sanders; only 13% of Democratic primary voters in Michigan said they wanted a candidate outside the establishment (82% said they wanted a candidate with experience in politics), yet the former group chose Sanders by more than 4-1.
The other source of Sanders support was people under 30, “the young.” Exit polls didn’t zero in on the young but the importance of their vote can be inferred by another measure. While Sanders was winning those who wanted more liberal policies than Obama by 3-1, Clinton was winning those who wanted to continue Obama’s policies by just 2-1. It’s likely that many young voters said that they wanted to continue Obama’s policies and voted for Sanders, thus reducing Clinton’s margin among this group by enough to lose the primary. Had she won by same margin among “continue Obama policies” that Sanders won with the left, she would have won Michigan.
This coalition was enough for a slight victory (49.69 to 48.26) in Michigan, a state that had other demographic factors that benefited him beyond being an open primary. Rules were not the only thing which kept people from voting for Sanders because if they were he would have done far better in all the open primaries of which there are lots. Still this coalition took Sanders to 42% nationally; the young and the disgruntled moved him beyond his expected one-third based on the left vote. But it couldn’t get him to a majority; there are not enough of these kind of voters in the Democratic base to counter-act the Clinton coalition that included significant numbers of minorities, particularly African Americans, and older voters.
So could the open primaries that Sanders is demanding get a future candidate across the majority threshold? Probably not. A Sanders-equivalent couldn’t count on getting more left voters in open primaries. For the most part, they are already registered Democrats (or were able to become so for Sanders with relative ease in most places) and thus seem stuck at about one-third of the Democratic electorate. Open primaries might attract the young and the disgruntled that powered Sanders past his left base, but they still can’t make up for a weakness in minority support, which will continue to be the backbone of Democratic voters.
Even if more open primaries and their pull of young and disgruntled voters would have boosted Sanders this year, they wouldn’t necessarily help another progressive in the future. Voting coalitions can’t be expected to be stable. The Clinton coalition from 2008 fractured somewhat this year. Clinton did much better with African Americans and the rich than she did in 2008, but she did worse with almost all other groups. Because African Americans and the rich are a larger part of the Democratic coalition than the “left,”, Clinton won with room to spare. (She won lots of other groups, she just did not beat her numbers in 2008 with them.)
To build a 50% plus 1 coalition, the Sanders coalition would have to add more voters, almost certainly from non-whites. But adding non-whites to a coalition can mean losing white voters. In this cycle, white voters in states such as Oklahoma, Kentucky and West Virginia clearly punished Clinton for her association with Obama.
Open primaries pose their own dangers. Because there were competitive contests on both sides this time, cross-over voting for the sole purpose of messing with the other side was minimized. (There were some reports that Democrats voted for Republicans in Virginia’s open primary to oppose Trump.) But that might not always be the case. A candidate of the left some day might want to prevent moderate Republican voters (The Kasich Voter) from flooding a primary to vote against him or her. Party registration may have blocked some Sanders voters this cycle but the left might be glad for those restrictions under different circumstances.
There is also another way in which Sanders is fighting the last war. By undermining the idea of a party and insisting on being a separate unit, Sanders supporters may be limiting their own effectiveness. Sanders’ 2.7 million donors and his enthusiastic rally attendees, if they were willing to put in the work, could seize control of the Democratic Party. The procedures are somewhat complicated and the process might be long, but if the Sanders left was willing to fight the establishment forces for control of the party, they certainly would have a shot to win. Using one of the two major political parties as a vehicle for accomplishing policy goals can work. In the end, the civil rights movement captured the Democratic Party almost completely. There were a lot of struggles, but President Obama is the direct result of that capture. Is the Democratic party as responsive to the concerns of African Americans as it should be? Probably not, but by working within the party, they gained a lot. By insisting upon open primaries, Sanders is sending a clear signal that there’s no value in being a party member and discourages this sort of capture.
The next candidate of the left will be disserved if the current candidate of the left pushes hard for rule changes that would have benefited him but can’t be counted on to benefit similar candidates in the future. It also doesn’t help to discourages participation within what is America’s only currently viable left party.
On this front, we believe Sanders is fighting the last war. One of the most difficult things in politics is to think ahead. There is no doubt open primaries that allowed other than Democrats to vote would have benefited Sanders slightly in this election. Sanders’s two other proposed rule changes, the end of super delegates and same-day registration, also would have benefited him in this election. But as Hillary Clinton quickly discovered, support in one race does not automatically transfer to the next race. Open primaries won’t necessarily benefit progressives in future races.
To see that, we can look at what happened in an open primary this year where Sanders won with a coalition of the left, the disgruntled and the young. Sanders’ support began with people who wanted more liberal policies than those pursued by the President, what might be considered “the left.” In Michigan’s open primary, these liberals were 31% of the electorate, according to exit polls. They voted for Sanders by a nearly 3-1 margin. This was his base in state after state and it would have won him 30% of the vote regardless.
Another 13% of those voting in the Michigan Democratic party wanted more conservative policies than those of the President. Bernie Sanders is not to Barack Obama’s right on a single issue and yet Sanders was able to win 53% of this group. Sanders may like to believe these conservative voters joined his movement but perhaps they simply did not know much about Sanders beyond the fact that he was against the powers that be and he was not Clinton. They constituted “the disgruntled” in his coalition. Another exit poll question revealed how strongly this group went for Sanders; only 13% of Democratic primary voters in Michigan said they wanted a candidate outside the establishment (82% said they wanted a candidate with experience in politics), yet the former group chose Sanders by more than 4-1.
The other source of Sanders support was people under 30, “the young.” Exit polls didn’t zero in on the young but the importance of their vote can be inferred by another measure. While Sanders was winning those who wanted more liberal policies than Obama by 3-1, Clinton was winning those who wanted to continue Obama’s policies by just 2-1. It’s likely that many young voters said that they wanted to continue Obama’s policies and voted for Sanders, thus reducing Clinton’s margin among this group by enough to lose the primary. Had she won by same margin among “continue Obama policies” that Sanders won with the left, she would have won Michigan.
This coalition was enough for a slight victory (49.69 to 48.26) in Michigan, a state that had other demographic factors that benefited him beyond being an open primary. Rules were not the only thing which kept people from voting for Sanders because if they were he would have done far better in all the open primaries of which there are lots. Still this coalition took Sanders to 42% nationally; the young and the disgruntled moved him beyond his expected one-third based on the left vote. But it couldn’t get him to a majority; there are not enough of these kind of voters in the Democratic base to counter-act the Clinton coalition that included significant numbers of minorities, particularly African Americans, and older voters.
So could the open primaries that Sanders is demanding get a future candidate across the majority threshold? Probably not. A Sanders-equivalent couldn’t count on getting more left voters in open primaries. For the most part, they are already registered Democrats (or were able to become so for Sanders with relative ease in most places) and thus seem stuck at about one-third of the Democratic electorate. Open primaries might attract the young and the disgruntled that powered Sanders past his left base, but they still can’t make up for a weakness in minority support, which will continue to be the backbone of Democratic voters.
Even if more open primaries and their pull of young and disgruntled voters would have boosted Sanders this year, they wouldn’t necessarily help another progressive in the future. Voting coalitions can’t be expected to be stable. The Clinton coalition from 2008 fractured somewhat this year. Clinton did much better with African Americans and the rich than she did in 2008, but she did worse with almost all other groups. Because African Americans and the rich are a larger part of the Democratic coalition than the “left,”, Clinton won with room to spare. (She won lots of other groups, she just did not beat her numbers in 2008 with them.)
To build a 50% plus 1 coalition, the Sanders coalition would have to add more voters, almost certainly from non-whites. But adding non-whites to a coalition can mean losing white voters. In this cycle, white voters in states such as Oklahoma, Kentucky and West Virginia clearly punished Clinton for her association with Obama.
Open primaries pose their own dangers. Because there were competitive contests on both sides this time, cross-over voting for the sole purpose of messing with the other side was minimized. (There were some reports that Democrats voted for Republicans in Virginia’s open primary to oppose Trump.) But that might not always be the case. A candidate of the left some day might want to prevent moderate Republican voters (The Kasich Voter) from flooding a primary to vote against him or her. Party registration may have blocked some Sanders voters this cycle but the left might be glad for those restrictions under different circumstances.
There is also another way in which Sanders is fighting the last war. By undermining the idea of a party and insisting on being a separate unit, Sanders supporters may be limiting their own effectiveness. Sanders’ 2.7 million donors and his enthusiastic rally attendees, if they were willing to put in the work, could seize control of the Democratic Party. The procedures are somewhat complicated and the process might be long, but if the Sanders left was willing to fight the establishment forces for control of the party, they certainly would have a shot to win. Using one of the two major political parties as a vehicle for accomplishing policy goals can work. In the end, the civil rights movement captured the Democratic Party almost completely. There were a lot of struggles, but President Obama is the direct result of that capture. Is the Democratic party as responsive to the concerns of African Americans as it should be? Probably not, but by working within the party, they gained a lot. By insisting upon open primaries, Sanders is sending a clear signal that there’s no value in being a party member and discourages this sort of capture.
The next candidate of the left will be disserved if the current candidate of the left pushes hard for rule changes that would have benefited him but can’t be counted on to benefit similar candidates in the future. It also doesn’t help to discourages participation within what is America’s only currently viable left party.
Wednesday, June 15, 2016
Polling Update 3
Republican
Unity was able to produce a tie for Donald Trump in the national polls but in
the last two weeks that tie has slipped away. Hillary Clinton now has taken a
5.6 lead in the RCP average and leads in every poll that makes up the average.
(RCP doesn’t include online polls.) It is not a big lead but it is a bigger
polling lead than the percentage Obama won by in 2012. The online polls, which
we are so far ignoring but may examine at some point, show similar trends
In addition
to the head-to-head matchups as revealed in the RCP polls, we are seeing two
continuing and interesting trends. First, Trump seems stuck around 40% of the
vote in a large number of the polls. That speaks to the challenge he faces. The
voters he needs now don’t have a good opinion of him and he is not making
things better.
Second, poll
respondents who say they are undecided or prefer a third party is higher than
it has been in an election in a long time. Clinton and Trump combined currently
only hold 82.4% of the vote. The number who support the candidates of the two
leading parties is likely to increase but there’s a chance we might see another
President (like Clinton in 1992 and 1996) who wins without a majority of the
votes.
Still, Hillary
Clinton is gaining, which is a much bigger problem for Trump than for other
candidates. Being a winner is essential to his brand. Being behind is very hard
for him but that seems to be what he faces at the moment.
Monday, June 13, 2016
Democratic Preview: Washington, D.C. Primary
The road has
ended, yet we will still make a call for book keeping purposes. Hillary Clinton
should win D.C. Allocations follow.
Final tallies will be posted soon.
Total: Clinton 13 Sanders 7
|
Delegate Allocation
|
Clinton
|
Sanders
|
|
DC AL
|
3
|
2
|
|
DC PLEO
|
1
|
1
|
|
DC MD 1
|
5
|
2
|
|
DC MD 2
|
4
|
2
|
Saturday, June 11, 2016
The Brutality of Math
The primaries are now over and we can look back on the lessons of this primary season. The most important lesson is that, as much as people may want to run away from math, it has an inescapable way of catching up with them.
Let’s begin with the Democrats. Because of the party’s much maligned super delegates, Sanders was always going to have to rely on winning the majority of pledged delegates to have any hope. March 1st absolutely and completely ended the possibility of that happening. In a proportional system, the 200-plus delegates that Clinton had won by March 1st was fatal for Sanders.
We now have the advantage of knowing the results from the remaining states but if you pause on Clinton’s March 1st lead and attempt to reconstruct a Sanders’ win in pledged delegates from there it is nearly impossible. This race has been over for three months. Proportionately meant that once Clinton got an early lead through huge wins in Texas, Georgia and Alabama, it was nearly impossible to overcome. But proportionately also meant that Sanders never was too far behind. There was an illusion of a competitive race. Contests changed hands with Clinton winning some and Sanders winning some. (Sanders benefited from more wins on days with just one primary.) Still the core reality was never in doubt.
What is so perplexing about all of this is that the Sanders campaign did not ever seem to have a plan on how it could possibly win. Rather than working the March 1st states, Sanders built a momentum strategy that depended heavily on winning New Hampshire. Sanders gave New Hampshire massive and disproportionate attention, seemingly believing a win there could spring his entire campaign into action. It worked in the sense that he won New Hampshire big. It did not work in the sense that New Hampshire did not end up having the magic powers the Sanders campaign hoped it would. Sanders also needed Nevada, which was 11 days later. He needed something to slow Clinton in South Carolina, which was the gateway to March 1st. He didn’t get it. Clinton won a landslide in South Carolina and three days later, on March 1st, she took Texas, Georgia and Alabama and the race was over.
Sanders’ effort turned out to be message campaign that did much better than expected but one that had no plan to win. If you disagree with this argument that is fine, but you have to explain how Sanders was going to win a majority of pledged delegates after March 1st or you cannot really speak to the potential for a different outcome.
The Republicans had a similar problem. The Republican rules basically have the effect of giving a plurality leader the win. That is how the math works. Trump’s media domination and the fact the field was so large meant that he looked like a favorite for a plurality throughout. Collusion among the other candidates was needed to beat him. The other Republicans needed a plan to shrink the field as quickly as possible or, failing that, encourage supporters of one candidate to vote for the more viable other candidate in particular states. With some collusion, Trump could have been shutout in Texas. But since all the other candidates wanted to win more than they wanted Trump to lose, there was nothing that could be done to stop Trump under the existing Republican rules. We clearly warned of it at the time. Math is math and the Republicans, like the Democrats, ignored it throughout the contest.
Simple mathematical realities dictate how the primary process works. Lots of people ignored these realities in the name of telling a story about fierce primary fight but that story was wrong and the math was right. Ideally, people will learn the lesson for the general election and not just the data journalists but all of us.
Let’s begin with the Democrats. Because of the party’s much maligned super delegates, Sanders was always going to have to rely on winning the majority of pledged delegates to have any hope. March 1st absolutely and completely ended the possibility of that happening. In a proportional system, the 200-plus delegates that Clinton had won by March 1st was fatal for Sanders.
We now have the advantage of knowing the results from the remaining states but if you pause on Clinton’s March 1st lead and attempt to reconstruct a Sanders’ win in pledged delegates from there it is nearly impossible. This race has been over for three months. Proportionately meant that once Clinton got an early lead through huge wins in Texas, Georgia and Alabama, it was nearly impossible to overcome. But proportionately also meant that Sanders never was too far behind. There was an illusion of a competitive race. Contests changed hands with Clinton winning some and Sanders winning some. (Sanders benefited from more wins on days with just one primary.) Still the core reality was never in doubt.
What is so perplexing about all of this is that the Sanders campaign did not ever seem to have a plan on how it could possibly win. Rather than working the March 1st states, Sanders built a momentum strategy that depended heavily on winning New Hampshire. Sanders gave New Hampshire massive and disproportionate attention, seemingly believing a win there could spring his entire campaign into action. It worked in the sense that he won New Hampshire big. It did not work in the sense that New Hampshire did not end up having the magic powers the Sanders campaign hoped it would. Sanders also needed Nevada, which was 11 days later. He needed something to slow Clinton in South Carolina, which was the gateway to March 1st. He didn’t get it. Clinton won a landslide in South Carolina and three days later, on March 1st, she took Texas, Georgia and Alabama and the race was over.
Sanders’ effort turned out to be message campaign that did much better than expected but one that had no plan to win. If you disagree with this argument that is fine, but you have to explain how Sanders was going to win a majority of pledged delegates after March 1st or you cannot really speak to the potential for a different outcome.
The Republicans had a similar problem. The Republican rules basically have the effect of giving a plurality leader the win. That is how the math works. Trump’s media domination and the fact the field was so large meant that he looked like a favorite for a plurality throughout. Collusion among the other candidates was needed to beat him. The other Republicans needed a plan to shrink the field as quickly as possible or, failing that, encourage supporters of one candidate to vote for the more viable other candidate in particular states. With some collusion, Trump could have been shutout in Texas. But since all the other candidates wanted to win more than they wanted Trump to lose, there was nothing that could be done to stop Trump under the existing Republican rules. We clearly warned of it at the time. Math is math and the Republicans, like the Democrats, ignored it throughout the contest.
Simple mathematical realities dictate how the primary process works. Lots of people ignored these realities in the name of telling a story about fierce primary fight but that story was wrong and the math was right. Ideally, people will learn the lesson for the general election and not just the data journalists but all of us.
Thursday, June 9, 2016
Trump’s Money Problem
Donald
Trump’s greatest claim to fame is that he is rich beyond all imagining. There
is thus a rich (pardon the expression) irony emerging in the presidential
contest. Because Trump is not in fact rich beyond all imagining, Trump is
facing a very real challenge having enough money to run a campaign.
We have
discussed this issue before http://mcfd2016.blogspot.com/2016/05/can-donald-trump-raise-money-he-needs.html. But it is important to repeat and
expand this claim because the reports about his fundraising over the last month
have not been good. The big donors don’t seem to be there. Trump had one major
fundraiser in Los Angeles but did not announce a fundraising total. We are also
seeing stories like this one http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-money-idUSKCN0YV1NV?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=Social.
In it, there are lots of complaints from donors about Trump but
no dollar commitments from donors for Trump. Trump’s comments this past
week about the Mexican-American judge who is presiding over his fraud trial have
not been helpful. Big donors hear that and wonder why they would possibly want
to be part of this campaign.
Trump’s
efforts with small donors don’t seem to be going any better. He has yet to
incorporate into his speeches a line begging his supporters for small donations.
It is really hard for him to do that because
part of his appeal to his small army of supporters is that they believe he is
so rich he does not need them.
As a result
of these problems, Trump has gone from saying, “I am going to raise a ton of
money,” to “I don’t really need money, others think I do.”
The latter attitude is wrong. A real campaign knocks on doors
and drives turnout. It defends itself against an opponent’s television blitz.
When an opponent attacked Trump with serious resources in Wisconsin, Trump was
beaten badly. That the Republican establishment ran out of gas was surprising
but it does not mean money is meaningless. To win, Trump needs the demographics
of the electorate to change a bit. Without resources, Trump is just praying for
a different electorate, not working for it.
We will know
more at the end of the month, or maybe mid-July, about Trump’s ability to
fundraise, but it seems like there is no good news for him on this front.
Wednesday, June 8, 2016
Welcome to the General Election
Last night
ended the primary process. Secretary Clinton passed the threshold for a
majority of the overall delegates needed to win as well as a majority of
pledged delegates. She ended up winning by about 370 delegates (counting is
still going on and D.C. is to come).
At the
moment, the key to this election is a battle for unity. Whichever candidate can
best unify his or her party will start as a favorite. In 2012, when both
parties were almost wholly united, the Democrats won because of superior
demographics.
What is
interesting is that Republican elites currently seem more divided than ever
over Trump. Trump’s comments attacking
the judge in his fraud case have given pause to many and provoked an
un-endorsement from one U.S. Senator. More problems are to come. So far all of
this bad news is having little effect on Republican voters who seem ready to
roll with it all but that could change if the outrages add up.
On the
Democratic side, elites have been with Clinton from the beginning and the small
number who have been with Sanders are unwilling to overturn the winner of the
pledged delegates. As the Democratic process wraps up this week, we should see a
turn toward unity fairly quickly. The
question is whether Democratic voters, a substantial number of whom rejected
the presumptive nominee, will go the way of their elites. That seems the only
major uncertainty that keeps this from being a fairly predictable race.
Monday, June 6, 2016
Second to Last Democratic Primary Preview: California, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota
With the exception of D.C. next
week, we have reached the end of the Democratic primary process. California has
turned into a very interesting race as polling shows a quite close contest. If
enough younger people turn out, Sanders may in fact win. We don’t think that
will happen but would not be surprised if it did. Regardless, the final California
results will be tallied long after Clinton clinches the majority of delegates. At
this point, Clinton is at most 50 delegates away from a majority of delegates, which
she gets in New Jersey at 8 p.m. (The AP has already called it for her based on
its reporting of super delegates’ commitments.) We think Clinton will win
California, New Jersey, and New Mexico. We think Sanders will win Montana and
North Dakota. South Dakota is our greatest puzzle. We think Sanders wins, but we
are not remotely sure. Full delegate allocations follow.
Total: Clinton 365 Sanders 329
California
Total: Clinton 248 Sanders 227
Delegate Allocation
|
Clinton
|
Sanders
|
CA AL
|
55
|
50
|
CA PLEO
|
28
|
25
|
CA 1
|
3
|
3
|
CA 2
|
4
|
4
|
CA 3
|
3
|
3
|
CA 4
|
3
|
3
|
CA 5
|
3
|
4
|
CA 6
|
3
|
3
|
CA 7
|
3
|
3
|
CA 8
|
2
|
3
|
CA 9
|
3
|
3
|
CA 10
|
3
|
2
|
CA 11
|
3
|
4
|
CA 12
|
4
|
5
|
CA 13
|
3
|
5
|
CA 14
|
3
|
4
|
CA 15
|
3
|
4
|
CA 16
|
3
|
2
|
CA 17
|
3
|
3
|
CA 18
|
4
|
4
|
CA 19
|
3
|
3
|
CA 20
|
3
|
3
|
CA 21
|
2
|
2
|
CA 22
|
3
|
2
|
CA 23
|
3
|
2
|
CA 24
|
3
|
3
|
CA 25
|
3
|
2
|
CA 26
|
3
|
3
|
CA 27
|
3
|
3
|
CA 28
|
4
|
3
|
CA 29
|
3
|
2
|
CA 30
|
4
|
3
|
CA 31
|
3
|
2
|
CA 32
|
3
|
3
|
CA 33
|
4
|
3
|
CA 34
|
3
|
2
|
CA 35
|
3
|
2
|
CA 36
|
2
|
3
|
CA 37
|
4
|
3
|
CA 38
|
3
|
3
|
CA 39
|
3
|
3
|
CA 40
|
3
|
2
|
CA 41
|
3
|
2
|
CA 42
|
3
|
2
|
CA 43
|
4
|
2
|
CA 44
|
3
|
3
|
CA 45
|
3
|
3
|
CA 46
|
3
|
2
|
CA 47
|
3
|
3
|
CA 48
|
3
|
3
|
CA 49
|
3
|
3
|
CA 50
|
3
|
2
|
CA 51
|
3
|
2
|
CA 52
|
3
|
3
|
CA 53
|
4
|
3
|
Montana
Total: Sanders 12 Clinton 9
Delegate Allocation
|
Sanders
|
Clinton
|
MT AL
|
2
|
2
|
MT PLEO
|
1
|
1
|
MT Eastern
|
4
|
3
|
MT Western
|
5
|
3
|
New
Jersey
Total: Clinton 73 Sanders 53
NJ Delegate allocation
|
Clinton
|
Sanders
|
NJ AL
|
16
|
12
|
NJ PLEO
|
8
|
6
|
NJ DD 1
|
2
|
2
|
NJ DD 2
|
2
|
2
|
NJ DD 3
|
3
|
2
|
NJ DD 4
|
3
|
2
|
NJ DD 5
|
2
|
2
|
NJ DD 6
|
2
|
2
|
NJ DD 7
|
2
|
1
|
NJ DD 8
|
3
|
2
|
NJ DD 9
|
2
|
2
|
NJ DD 10
|
3
|
1
|
NJ DD 11
|
3
|
2
|
NJ DD 12
|
2
|
2
|
NJ DD 13
|
2
|
1
|
NJ DD 14
|
2
|
2
|
NJ DD 15
|
3
|
2
|
NJ DD 16
|
3
|
1
|
NJ DD 17
|
3
|
1
|
NJ DD 18
|
3
|
2
|
NJ DD 19
|
2
|
2
|
NJ DD 20
|
2
|
2
|
New Mexico
Total: Clinton 19 Sanders 15
Delegate Allocation
|
Clinton
|
Sanders
|
NM AL
|
4
|
3
|
NM PLEO
|
2
|
2
|
NM 1
|
5
|
3
|
NM 2
|
4
|
3
|
NM 3
|
4
|
4
|
North
Dakota
Total:
Sanders 12 Clinton 6
Delegate Allocation
|
Sanders
|
Clinton
|
ND AL
|
3
|
1
|
ND PLEO
|
1
|
1
|
ND 1
|
8
|
4
|
12
|
6
|
South
Dakota
Total:
Sanders 10 Clinton 10
Delegate Allocation
|
Sanders
|
Clinton
|
SD AL
|
2
|
2
|
SD PLEO
|
1
|
1
|
SD 1
|
7
|
7
|
