The Brutality of Math

The primaries are now over and we can look back on the lessons of this primary season. The most important lesson is that, as much as people may want to run away from math, it has an inescapable way of catching up with them.

Let’s begin with the Democrats. Because of the party’s much maligned super delegates, Sanders was always going to have to rely on winning the majority of pledged delegates to have any hope. March 1st absolutely and completely ended the possibility of that happening. In a proportional system, the 200-plus delegates that Clinton had won by March 1st was fatal for Sanders.

We now have the advantage of knowing the results from the remaining states but if you pause on Clinton’s March 1st lead and attempt to reconstruct a Sanders’ win in pledged delegates from there it is nearly impossible. This race has been over for three months. Proportionately meant that once Clinton got an early lead through huge wins in Texas, Georgia and Alabama, it was nearly impossible to overcome. But proportionately also meant that Sanders never was too far behind. There was an illusion of a competitive race. Contests changed hands with Clinton winning some and Sanders winning some. (Sanders benefited from more wins on days with just one primary.) Still the core reality was never in doubt.

What is so perplexing about all of this is that the Sanders campaign did not ever seem to have a plan on how it could possibly win. Rather than working the March 1st states, Sanders built a momentum strategy that depended heavily on winning New Hampshire. Sanders gave New Hampshire massive and disproportionate attention, seemingly believing a win there could spring his entire campaign into action. It worked in the sense that he won New Hampshire big. It did not work in the sense that New Hampshire did not end up having the magic powers the Sanders campaign hoped it would. Sanders also needed Nevada, which was 11 days later. He needed something to slow Clinton in South Carolina, which was the gateway to March 1st. He didn’t get it. Clinton won a landslide in South Carolina and three days later, on March 1st, she took Texas, Georgia and Alabama and the race was over.

Sanders’ effort turned out to be message campaign that did much better than expected but one that had no plan to win. If you disagree with this argument that is fine, but you have to explain how Sanders was going to win a majority of pledged delegates after March 1st or you cannot really speak to the potential for a different outcome.

The Republicans had a similar problem. The Republican rules basically have the effect of giving a plurality leader the win. That is how the math works. Trump’s media domination and the fact the field was so large meant that he looked like a favorite for a plurality throughout. Collusion among the other candidates was needed to beat him. The other Republicans needed a plan to shrink the field as quickly as possible or, failing that, encourage supporters of one candidate to vote for the more viable other candidate in particular states. With some collusion, Trump could have been shutout in Texas. But since all the other candidates wanted to win more than they wanted Trump to lose, there was nothing that could be done to stop Trump under the existing Republican rules. We clearly warned of it at the time. Math is math and the Republicans, like the Democrats, ignored it throughout the contest.

Simple mathematical realities dictate how the primary process works. Lots of people ignored these realities in the name of telling a story about fierce primary fight but that story was wrong and the math was right. Ideally, people will learn the lesson for the general election and not just the data journalists but all of us.